Prime Minister Maliki also ensured that there would be no political interference in the operation, which meant that the Sadrists were no longer under his protection. The targets of Fardh al-Qanoon included both Shi’a and Sunni extremists in all areas of Baghdad. ![]() The strategy emphasized population security and the holding of previously-cleared terrain. They moved into neighborhoods across the city to conduct systematic clearing operations. In early 2007, Coalition and Iraqi forces prepared for the Baghdad security offensive, Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Enforcing the Law), which was launched on February 14, 2007. 13 By late 2006, the Sadrist political and religious leadership had little control over the disparate groups operating under the JAM banner. As JAM leaders became less responsive to his demands, Sadr reportedly tried to discipline the movement by reprimanding or firing insubordinates, albeit to little effect. 12 Likewise, growing Iranian support for different elements of Muqtada’s movement further undermined centralized control. As local commanders grew more powerful and financially independent, they became less likely to follow orders from Muqtada al-Sadr and the clerical leadership in Najaf. 11 The rapid growth in the movement from 2004 to 2006 and the subsequent emergence of a mafia-like system undermined Muqtada al-Sadr’s control over his commanders. 10 JAM groups operated criminal rackets in Shi’a neighborhoods across Baghdad to generate funding, intimidate the local population, and maintain power. Many JAM commanders largely financed themselves after the Haeri funding stream ceased in late 2004. ![]() JAM had always functioned as a loosely organized movement. JAM soon controlled large areas of Baghdad and they increasingly relied upon corruption, intimidation, and extortion to enhance their wealth and power.Īs sectarian violence raged in Baghdad, an increasing number of local JAM commanders began to splinter from the movement. 9 By mid-2006 these militias were engaged in a violent campaign of expansion into Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods. However, the organization also spawned death squads responsible for sectarian cleansing. In the wake of the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra (one of the holiest Shi’a shrines) and frequent attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, JAM positioned itself as a security guarantor for the Shi’a. 8 JAM Expansion in Baghdadīy late 2006, at the height of sectarian violence, the Sadrists were a formidable military force. 7 Sistani brokered a truce with Muqtada al-Sadr that contained several demands: the removal of JAM fighters from the sacred Imam Ali shrine and the city of Najaf the withdrawal of Coalition Forces from the city the creation of a demilitarized zone in Najaf and Kufa the appointment of the Iraqi Security Forces to guard the cities and the shrines and compensation for citizens whose property had been damaged in the fighting. 6Īttempts to negotiate an end to the ongoing fighting stalled until August 26, 2004, when Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani returned to Najaf from receiving medical treatment in London. tanks and helicopters continued their precision assault. ![]() 5 Militia fighters operated in and around the holy shrines and the main cemetery - some of the most sacred places in the Shi’a tradition - which they used as sanctuary. 4 The conflict escalated as JAM clashed with Coalition Forces across Najaf. Marine patrol in Najaf which they believed was coming to arrest Muqtada al-Sadr. A second uprising broke out in Najaf in August 2004, 3 after JAM fighters attacked a U.S. The ceasefire brokered between Coalition officials, Iraqi politicians, and Sadrist leaders was short-lived. The first conflict between the Coalition and JAM ended in late May 2004. The shrines suffered minimal damage, but the militiamen suffered heavy losses in the fighting. Ultimately, JAM fighters were no match for U.S. The fighting lasted for nearly two months. While the militiamen were overall poorly trained, they took tactical positions in and around the holy shrines of Karbala, Kufa and Najaf, complicating the ability of Coalition Forces to use heavy firepower - and enhancing the militia’s ability to control access to these shrines and the revenue they generated. forces initiated major operations against the Mahdi Army fighters. When Coalition Forces shut down the main Sadrist newspaper, al Hawza, on Maand arrested prominent Sadrist aide, Mustafa al-Yacoubi, several days later, JAM fighters mobilized and launched major uprisings in Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, and Kufa. The militia became prominent in 2004 when it fought against U.S. ![]() The militia also defended Sadrist political institutions and Muqtada’s interests. The Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM, جيش المهدي) militia emerged in 2003 as a security guarantor in Sadrist-dominated neighborhoods.
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